We believe such a revolution is not only possible but necessary—and that’s why we’re endorsing Bernie Sanders for president. This magazine rarely makes endorsements in the Democratic primary (we’ve done so only twice: for Jesse Jackson in 1988, and for Barack Obama in 2008). We do so now impelled by the awareness that our rigged system works for the few and not for the many. Americans are waking up to this reality, and they are demanding change. This understanding animates both the Republican and Democratic primaries, though it has taken those two contests in fundamentally different directions.
On June of 2015, I was #feelingthebern as I saw went to see Bernie speak. He tickled every socialist bone in my body. It was obvious to those who showed up that Sanders’s suggested policies, which have been carried through the winter debates, pushed the European style of socialism he’s famous for touting. The crowd, from young to old and from all races, loved and ate up the leftist material.
I understand the allure of Sanders, but the more impressive aspect of his campaign is the slow and steady growth of followers that has recently turned into a foe for the assumed nominee Hillary Clinton. The problem is the exposure he’s gotten: close to none until recently. With his numbers surging, he’s surpassed Clinton in a few polls. Also, I’m impressed with the coverage network and cable television now gives him. It’s clear the change in the minds of Democrats taking part of these polls is generating some serious heat (*insert “burn” pun*).
At this point, there’s no reason to point out the real difference between the two, while seeing the similarities. Both want to raise taxes, but the intended audiences are fall on different tax brackets. Taxes are definitive political bell cow for the left and Democrats. Millions supporting tax reform are enthralled with the discussion and the national conversation among Democratic pundits are the falling in line, too, but the writing may still be far from off the wall. Those same pundits don’t doubt the establishment and don’t see anything but that: the established stay as such. Hillary will have a difficult time losing the battle between her and Sanders. I’m a fan of the Sanders’s policies, but I don’t know how realistic it is for him to challenge the right.
I spent much more time than I expected learning about post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy in Latin America and am proud of the understanding I have it. Below is a paper written in early December of 2014 for my graduate degree. Dr. Brandon Mill taught “Special Subjects in History: Readings in Colonialism/Post-Colonialism” in which the final assignment was a historiographic essay over a previously researched period or event while in the class. The paper highlights a serious of books on theoretical frameworks of WHAT to U.S. involvement in the region may be framed as; no true definition exists because the U.S. does not recognize their time in Latin America as anything but “democratic support”. The two pictures I chose to use for the web publication of this paper reflect the sentiments and conclusion I present. It should be noted this version of the paper was hardly touched in an attempt to produce a version acceptable for public viewing. Also, this paper (and me) do not reflect the views and thoughts of the University of Colorado – Denver. Lastly, I appreciate all the support my professors at the university gave.
In June of 1954, Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz quickly prepared for a CIA-led coup by arming a dubious group of peasants in hopes of sustaining agrarian land reforms. The United Fruit Company lost leverage as workers’ wages increased. As it intended from its inception, the CIA intended to “maintain order” in Latin America, and Guatemala was ripe for intervention. Unfortunately, American officials knew it was “impossible to produce evidence clearly tying the Guatemalan government to Moscow,” the imperial rival of the United States. The American-backed Guatemalan Col. Castillo Armas mobilized a “Liberation Army.” Equipped with Czechoslovakian arms purchased with money given to him by the CIA, Armas failed in nearly every sense until their agents stepped in for him. After, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles remarked, “The evil purpose of the Kremlin to destroy the inter-American system,” in Guatemala was foiled by “the people.” Walter LaFeber, a U.S. diplomatic historian, views interventions like Guatemala “not only…different from, but opposed to, most of the U.S. revolutionary tradition” and sought informal control to advance U.S. foreign policy. The United States created an informal empire in Latin America through covert efforts during the Cold War.
Official United States foreign policy can be, at best, vague, just as unofficial policy carried out a diplomacy of guaranteed involvement, like actions in Guatemala, throughout Latin America to support a democratic vision. During the Cold War, Latin America became a hotbed of U.S. diplomatic and military action which led to changes in regimes, revolutions and counterrevolutions, and millions of civilian deaths, much of it under the guise to extend a neoliberal economic system. Scholarship since the end of the Cold War identifies these actions as informally “imperial”. In the context of exemplar works, scholars working in the field recognize the political impacts of these actions as problematic to the democratic vision the United States promotes around the world. These works identify informal empire through specific examples of imperial action, the impact on the region, and the political implications in American diplomacy for years to come. Paul A. Kramer points out, “…the imperial has long been a useful concept in work that attempts to situate the United States in global history, and it continues to be so, as demonstrated by a wealth of emerging scholarship.” He goes on to say:
The distinction between “formal” and “informal,” used to divide both imperial practices and types around the issue of state or corporate control; while it opened an imperial analytic to new phenomena, it also abstracted the relationship between state and capital and introduced new problems of exceptionalism.
Based on Kramer’s evaluation of empire and the exemplar previously mentioned, a historiography of U.S. foreign policy as informal empire is justified in explaining the purpose of military and diplomatic action taken in Latin America over the course of the Cold War.
Kramer is one of many from the Wisconsin School of American Diplomatic History, a collection of revisionist historians whose research led to the theory of, “the United States [being] a long history of expansionism, seeking foreign markets for profit and foreign territories for resources.” Williams A. Williams, one of the leaders of the Wisconsin School of American Diplomatic History and professor at the University of Wisconsin, found “empire” essential for continued consumption to the American psyche, as well as the promotion of wealth. From this internal desire, the United States, “projected [their] imperium outward upon others.” Thomas J. McCormick, a student of Williams, confirmed this view through his theory of the United States using diplomacy as the vehicle driving successful economic hegemony. He states the motivation of “empire by invention” through the Cold War supported peace and prosperity “witnessed by the unprecedented aggregate growth of global capitalism.” Historians from the Wisconsin School of American Diplomatic History produced a framework and narrative in which the evaluation of U.S. economic and diplomatic policies are informally imperial while counter frameworks or narratives explain these policies as quite formal and overtly imperial.
While evaluating “U.S. as informal empire,” comparisons between empires draw on questions of “exceptionalism” as sociologist Julian Go suggests, “Denying empire is simply part of the unique modus operandi of American empire itself.” Go’s argument is threefold: 1) how exceptional the United States has been, 2) identify similarities between the U.S. and British Empire, and 3) speculate on the United States’ future actions. To properly examine the U.S. empire, he is required to do so through the lens of “exceptionalism.” Go states, “America’s exceptional history and behavior are caused by its exceptional internal characteristics.” While comparing the U.S. and British empires, “America has engaged in informal noncolonial imperialism because of its unique ‘social system,’ which has no natural ‘ruling class’,” which itself is an indictment into the uniqueness, or exceptionalism, of America’s imperial ambitions.
Go’s intention of comparing the two empires begins with their ascent towards dominance. He compares Britain’s colonies as designed “substates” to the United States’ attempt to provincialize overseas lands as “territories” based on the Jeffersonian thought of “novel republicanism.” The methods in which the two colonies ruled in light of exceptionalism was highlighted by U.S. control over the Philippines and Britain’s colonizing of India. While evaluating the patterns of imperial aggression of the two empires, similarities appear as Go defined their trajectories as expansive, hegemonic, and reassertive in maintaining an imperial stronghold, with the last stage requiring the empire to officially recognize their imperial ambitions. Even though he recognized the informal imperialism of the United States, the comparison to the British Empire gave Go leverage to subjectively suggest the U.S. formally executed imperial actions. With novel republicanism as a central tenant to U.S. policy, implications of formal empire are not enough to define the United States as a formal empire. Go, a sociologist, failed to mention the unbreakable connection other historians found between economic and structural systems created by the United States during the Cold War. Lastly, comparing imperial systems in different times and spaces complicates any authentic claim to definitive recommendations of empire. Thus, as the claim expressed earlier, the United States has been an informal empire, specifically in Latin America, in its own right.
Body of Work
Originally written in 1980, William A. Williams’s Empire as a Way of Life not only represents a revisionist framework, but also a chronology of interventions by the United States throughout the world. The purpose of William’s work was to define Americans of all types favoring “empire” in the 18th and 19th centuries. This provided them with “renewable opportunities, wealth, and other benefits and satisfactions including a psychological sense of well-being and power” which he defines as an “imperial way of life.” Methodologically, Williams confronts the imperial way of life by considering the process as well as the imperial system. Williams began discussing Latin America intervention with the introduction of NSC-68, the pivotal piece of legislation marking a “general imperial responsibility…[to] establish a new order to replace the old.” Beyond this, Williams discussed little about Latin American during the Cold War, except for the Bay of Pigs invasion and a lengthy explanation of Henry Kissinger’s thoughts on Chilean President Salvador Allende’s election. Successfully overthrown governments emphasized William’s argument of quasi-military efforts in Latin America, but failed coups, like Guatemala, Chile, and Cuba, revealed discussion of how “American interests in the hemisphere” came before the desire of a particular countries democratic desires.
Williams’s focus is on his analytical framework, but this reveals more about how the United States used military constructs like NSC-68 to develop a method of hegemony. In examining U.S. foreign policy prior to 1950, Williams identified ambiguous policies determining imperial impulses, but once written:
Unquestionably, NSC-68 was one of the truly impressive imperial documents in the long tradition of the Western European expansion around the world. Its creation and adoption by the leaders of a society that was founded on the Declaration of Independence is mysterious or paradoxical only if one forgets John Locke and Thomas Jefferson.
U.S. intervention in Latin America would not have taken place without NSC-68, but the motivating factor came from “power and influence” of the United States and a global empire. The dissension between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. gave rise to imperial ventures, along with an executive and legislative justification to continue it through the Cold War. Williams’s work is a precursor to his successors as they would continue the revisionist narrative within the scholarship of U.S. diplomacy.
Picking up the torch of the Wisconsin School was Thomas J. McCormick with a review of the “evolution and devolution” of American hegemony in world affairs during the Cold War through a “modified world-system” analytic framework in America’s Half-Century. The framework under scrutiny was the, “…tension between economic internationalism and political nationalism that U.S. hegemony sought to resolve in America’s half-century since World War II.” McCormick began his review of America’s half-century by reviewing foreign policy decisions from the embrace of the Open Door policy as a marker of “American economic supremacy…served by an unlimited global market.” To McCormick, world war led periphery nations from the Pacific Rim, Mediterranean, and Latin America directly under U.S. hegemonic rule. Interest in Latin America mounted as the creation of Bretton Woods system with the intention to structure a loan system in which the United States would supply funds to friendly regimes. Others suffered as:
The United States attempted to defuse the neutralist movement by targeting key regimes for either covert overthrow or offers that were too good to refuse. The advantages of covert action were its relative inexpensiveness and its ability to partially mask American involvement.
While never using the term “colonial”, McCormack used an imperial U.S. foreign policy to outline a traditional hegemonic, colonial narrative, while frequently referring to it as an “informal empire” throughout the book. Latin America was just one of many regions.
If Williams’s “military power and influence” argument began the discussion, McCormick included economic hegemony to further explain the United States’ imperial ambitions. His theory is overtly revisionist as the entirety of his argument rests on U.S. hegemony, resulting in the large share of the market after the world wars. In the context of the Cold War, McCormick’s analytic framework explains how foreign and domestic factors fed military and economic decisions. This led to a policy of two cooperating forces, the U.S. and U.S.S.R., vying for the peripheries attention for a half-century. The only functional point made from his theory is the traditional lust and greed for power and resources empires seek. McCormick never overtly characterized America’s half-century as empire, but using his framework the United States is an informal, ruthless, resource hunting empire with little fore or afterthought when negligently replacing dictators, destroying whole swaths of an environment, or punishing small nations for never meeting Wall Street-like lending standards. Based on McCormick’s framework, Cold War diplomacy was two sided, but never involved the Soviet Union.
As the Simon Bolivar Professor of Latin American Studies at the University of California, Peter H. Smith argued structural patterns created to “uncover recurrent regularities within inter-American relationships, identify long-term trends, and analyze continuity and change.” Smith does this by framing U.S. diplomatic history in three different eras representing various levels of interaction and intervention within Latin America: the imperial era, the Cold War, and the War on Terror. During the imperial era, there was little success in stopping U.S. intervention as, “The Bolivian pursuit of continental unification produced ambiguous results.” Latin America was a focus for the United States during the Cold War, but countries had the difficult choice of complying, denying, or subverting the American system. None of the options during the Cold War worked and left the continent “susceptible to heavy-handed vigilance, covert action, and military intervention by the United States.” Between the Cold War and War on Terror, Smith identified the 1990s as a “Decade of Uncertainty,” as an ambiguous era lacking traditional imperial systems which left no clear front-runner in establishing a balance of power. He concluded the book with suggestions in how to deal with Latin America in era of extremism around the world, “Inter-American relations do not (and should not) exist in isolation.” Smith’s revisionist review of Latin American during the twentieth-century supports other narratives suggesting the talons of freedom protect and cause detriment in the same clutch.
Smith reduces much of the analyzed system and procedures into four factors which explain the patters and changes in U.S. diplomacy over time:
(1) The relative importance of Latin America vis-à-vis other regions, (2) perceptions of extrahemispheric rivalry, (3) definitions of U.S. national interests, and (4) the relationship between state actors and social groups in policy formation.
Smith discovered the change in patterns of distribution of power, policy goals, and procedures pushed the United States from a multipolar position to bipolar, to a multipolar, and back to a unipolar system based on unilateral military action taken in the last decade. The relationship described between the U.S. and Latin American countries creates an agency between the superpower and substate. As Smith concluded his book, he dedicated a portion to Latin American countries responses to the breakdown of a unipolar system, the rise of globalization, and strategies for progress. Smith’s narrative described a type of dependency not yet discussed.
Walter LaFeber’s Inevitable Revolutions looked at Central America’s interaction with the United States. This review of five specific countries (Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica) within a world-system, coined as “neodependency,” offers:
A way of looking at Latin American development, not in isolation, but as part of an international system in which the leading powers, have used their economic strength to make Latin American development dependent on–and subordinate to–the interests of those leading powers.
Within this neodependent system, LaFeber’s review is comprehensive going back to the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny, but he quickly moves into the Cold War as U.S. diplomacy focused on “Maintaining the System.” As neoliberal policies extended into Central America, Thomas Mann, an Eisenhower Administration official, suggested a change in policy at the end of the 1950s in which they focus on pushing democratic reform in Central America. Mann stated, “We should not endeavor to sell the specific word ‘Capitalism’ which is beyond rehabilitation in the minds of the non-white world.” Economic dependence was not just a theory as the practice of it broke down in the 1970s as romantic revolutionaries capitalized on extensive poverty. Part of the blame, LaFeber suggests, was the “failure of the Alliance for Progress and the collapse of the Central American Common Market” along with President Carter who “decreased governmental coercion and publicly attacked military regimes…urging [them] to fight revolutions.” The 1980s and the Reagan Administration left a slight increase in neodependent policy, but much of Central America was a “blood-soaked battle field” by the end of the decade. LaFeber ends with a review of Clinton Administration’s policies being uninterested in the region as Eastern Europe again erupted in conflict. Once again, U.S. foreign policy dictated the economic and political shape of Latin America.
LaFeber extended Peter H. Smith’s explanation of how policy required action from Latin America, but, unfortunately, saw a new form of colonial dependency. The neodependency system offers historians an explanation of how the United States reconciled the contradiction between its “professed ideals and its century-old foreign policy.” This ideological inconsistency led to violent conflict and American force, thus, “the result has been more revolution.” LaFeber discussed “‘dependency’…skewing Central American politics” as it offered an economic counter-balance to the empire in question. The neodependency system gave the U.S. “informal control” to show the Central American countries discussed in LaFeber’s book, “a confidence in capitalism, a willingness to use military force, a fear of foreign influence, and a dread of revolutionary instability.”
Greg Grandin’s scathing review of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America, Empire’s Workshop, gives an explanation of how:
Central America was [the United States’] proving ground, as a group of conservative defense officials worked hard to restore America’s sense of self-confidence in order to justify the carnage taking place there in the name of national defense.
The first quarter of the book gives an overview of late nineteenth, early twentieth-century policy which Grandin refers to as “How Latin America Saved the United States from Itself” with the intent to explain how reservationists at the turn of the century railed against imperial ambitions. Grandin points out rising labor unrest as a cause for U.S. corporations demanding protection while Washington found itself standing on the sidelines of the conflicts. Grandin gave agency to the colonized as he states:
For their part, Latin America’s landed class, Catholic Church, and military took advantage of the United States’s new Cold War policy to launch a continental counterrevolution, overturning newly democratic governments and forcing those constitutional regimes that survived to the right.
As he chronicled the evolution of a conservative foreign policy in Latin America, Grandin argues the rise of Nixonian-conservatism in which traditional Christian teachings became counter-intuitive and led to a “sharpened sense of class consciousness and unity of action among corporate leaders.” The last two chapters of the book are Grandin’s polemic against the rise of “new imperialism” starting with President Reagan’s policies of killing 300,000 and ending with President Bush’s “abuse of power.” The colonial relationship in Grandin’s work showed how informal empires’ consequences mirror the formal.
Empire’s Workshop began with a review of Open Door diplomacy, a demand by the U.S. for equal access to resources in Asia. Grandin pointed to this moment as, “The demand for legal ‘equality with all competing nations in the conditions of access to the markets’ provided the foundation for America’s informal empire.” In relation to other works, Grandin’s Marxist review extends LaFeber’s framework of neodependency as he thoroughly illustrates the United States’ “new imperialism”: an extreme form of LaFeber’s neodependency which gave Americans a “new birth of the confidence we used to have in ourselves.” Grandin’s focus was on economic hegemony set in motion by U.S. policymakers which mirrors McCormick’s binary theory. Grandin found economic and structural systems inseparable whereas McCormick differentiates between the two as a causal relationship. Grandin’s book is a micro-history of McCormick’s theory, which further shapes U.S. foreign policy as informally imperial.
One of the six central issues of Paul A. Kramer’s review of the imperial U.S. historiography is the “seductive dichotomy of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’,” where he defines, “‘formal’ indicating state-territorial control and ‘informal’ referring to either forms of economic control or the primacy of private-sector actors.” He goes on to say early scholarship chose to leave economic hegemony out of the discussion, thus, they, “comprehended the outlying world as already disciplined along capitalist lines.” After discussing literature and monographic arguments, Kramer concluded, “an imperial analytic can be applied to both capitalist and non-capitalist systems.” Differentiating the formal from the informal on the grounds of structural and economic history then supports and defines the United States as an informal empire: an empire in which the methods do not match the criteria of what Julian Go finds comparable to the British Empire. Unfortunately, the “formal vs. informal” debate comes down to definitions and semantics of said labels.
The scholarship reviewed represents a nation which sought to exploit a continent containing nineteen different countries during the Cold War. The most common threads to run through these works were political guidance and corporate influence with military actions as a byproduct in Latin America, all of which rest on the assumption the colonized lack the ability if given the opportunity to justly rule themselves. William A. Williams and Thomas J. McCormick argued the implementation of political structures was required to implement capitalistic mechanisms to benefit the United States. Peter H. Smith clarified these structures as they appeared covertly and then overtly unilateral throughout the last century. Walter LaFeber suggested the changing polarity in the world created a required neodependency of Latin America on the United States. Greg Grandin argued a new form of imperialism evolved out of a belief system which benefited those at the top, both at home and abroad. Those who have written on the historiography before, like Paul A. Kramer, agree with the analysis of Latin America diplomacy during the Cold War defined the United States as an informal empire.
Go, Julian. Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Grandin, Greg. Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007.
Kramer, Paul A. “Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World.” The American Historical Review 116, no. 5 (2011): 1348-391. doi:10.1086/ahr.116.5.1348.
LaFeber, Walter. Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 1993.
McCormick, Thomas J. America’s Half-century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War. 2nd ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995.
Smith, Peter H. Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Williams, William Appleman. Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Causes and Character of America’s Present Predicament, along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative. Brooklyn: Ig Publishing, 2007.
I do not mean to say, that the scenes of the revolution are now or ever will be entirely forgotten; but that like everything else, they must fade upon the memory of the world, and grow more and more dim by the lapse of time.
– Abraham Lincoln, 1838
Beyond typical partisanship lie the fringe. They never cease to exist, while never (seemingly) finding home in a mainstream party. Just like McCarthyism in the 1950s and the Silent Majority in the 1980s, a new wave of fringe support sprouted in early 2007 and has since continued at a low boil called the Tea Party. Once an anti-tax and anti-government protest during the initial moments of a recession, the movement made gains with the run and subsequent nomination of Barack Obama in late 2007. After edging out the nomination, John McCain set out to take the White House while catering certain parts of his platform to Tea Party extremists. Very early in their existence, it became clear among their other “antis” was arrogance and ignorance. One of the best examples was John McCain’s encounter with a disheveled supporter at a townhall meeting where the moment required him to counter her racist claim that Barack Obama was an “Arab” and “Muslim”.
By October of 2008, the Tea Party’s support and coalition forced critics and mainstream Republicans to recognize them as a legitimate political force. The problem has not been their “antis”, or arrogance, or ignorance, rather their outright attempt at manipulation of historical fact and creating an “anti-history” in an attempt to force a more palatable narrative for their constituents.
After spending the last seven years watching the build up of this conservative movement, a litany of negative elements have built against their own success. Jill Lepore points to a flawed collective memory and, as she boldly proclaims, the Tea Party, along with previous fringe movements, “When in doubt, in American politics, left, right, or center, deploy the Founding Fathers.”[ref]Jill Lepore, The Whites in Their Eyes. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2010, 14.[/ref] With Lepore’s ideas, an understanding of libertarian thought and neoliberal economic theory seems to be a more thorough explanation of party’s purpose, but a deification of the Founding Fathers and a purposeful twisting of United States history contributes to a view that some even in the Republican Party identify the Tea Party as out of sorts in the American political psyche. The impact of fringe groups can leave deep, irreversible scars on society. As the current volatile political landscape takes shape, it’s impossible not to notice the new, extreme ends of the political spectrum. This isn’t an anomaly in history, but unusual in American history as the most prominent galvanizing point would be the Civil War, an image burned into the American psyche no matter what side taken. From the 2008 Presidential Election and well into the future, the Tea Party is a political force here to stay. The populism it stirs has been unmatched by the liberal wing of the Democratic party, but comes with serious flaws and a background of (sometimes deliberately) erroneous history.
Members of the Tea Party like to quote the Founding Fathers and revolutionaries of the time, but fall short in completely understanding every aspect of their lives. Sam Adams spoke directly about this:
“A general dissolution of principles and manners will more surely overthrow the liberties of America than the whole force of the common enemy. While the people are virtuous they cannot be subdued; but when once they lose their virtue then will be ready to surrender their liberties to the first external or internal invader.”
Tea Party members indulge in quoting the Founding Fathers, but cherry-pick aspects of their words and lives. If they truly engaged with Adams’s quote, they would evaluate the purpose of virtue, both then and now: virtue, then, was achieved by only those that could afford it or were emancipated to the point of exercising independence for themselves. It might be that they are unknowingly victims of their own belief system as they fail to correctly discuss the disenfranchised, now and then, who have nothing to surrender, not even their virtue. Interpretation of history will always be subjective, as it should be, but the Tea Party fails when they twist the history of events to meet their needs and proclamations.
This could not be more evident than when an elected U.S. representative from Montana who called for another “Operation Wetback”, originally a 1954 program to end the U.S. initiated “Bracero” program of imported labor. As Helena real estate agent, representative Drew Turiano, ran for a congressional position in 2013 elaborated when stating, “It was called ‘Operation Wetback’ and that policy repatriated about 1.4 million illegal aliens that were in America from Mexico…He repatriated them along with their American-born children. President Eisenhower did that, it was called Operation Wetback. I think America needs another Operation Wetback.” I’ve done research on the U.S. initiated Bracero Program for my graduate degree and can confirm President Eisenhower approved the operation in hopes of curbing a tidal wave of illegal entrants in the 1950s. One of the leading historians of the Bracero Program, Kitty Calavita, noted Cold War rhetoric fanned the flame of discontent with the large number of Mexican workers crossing the border for work.[ref]Calavita, Kitty. Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the I.N.S. New York: Routledge, 1992.[/ref] The problem was not from loose border restrictions, but from the program itself: a program in conjunction with the Mexican government to import laborers in order to account for a labor shortage at the onset of World War II. Again, this program was INITIATED by the United States’ federal government. The Founding Fathers, not the Tea Party’s vision of them, would be turning in their graves upon learning this exclusive, anti-democratic lens the Tea Party views history through.
After watching this movement take place over the course of the Obama Administration, a review of it’s origins, a lengthy historical review, and the party’s political future, is the goal of this and a succession of posts. One aspect of the Tea Party is its invention of a new historical narrative which shaped the current collective memory of the founding of the United States of America. Another would be the acceptance of traditional libertarian values into the mainstream Republican platform. Race and religion become another contention point as they explain how stringent views shape the party’s exclusive past. The books evaluated in the successive posts, which also look at the aforementioned points, are as follows:
Alterman, Eric. Kabuki Democracy: The System vs. Barack Obama. New York: Nation, 2011. Print.
Blight, David W. Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2001. Print.
Bunch, William. The Backlash: Right-wing Radicals, Hi-def Hucksters, and Paranoid Politics in the Age of Obama. New York: Harper, 2010. Print.
Dimaggio, Anthony R. The Rise of the Tea Party: Political Discontent and Corporate Media in the Age of Obama. New York: Monthly Review, 2011. Print.
DiSalvo, Daniel. Engines of Change: Party Factions in American Politics, 1868-2010. New York: Oxford UP, 2012. Print.
Foley, Elizabeth Price. The Tea Party: Three Principles. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2012. Print.
Formisano, Ronald P. The Tea Party: A Brief History. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2012. Print.
Kabaservice, Geoffrey M. Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican Party, from Eisenhower to the Tea Party. New York: Oxford UP, 2012. Print.
Lepore, Jill. The Whites of Their Eyes: The Tea Party’s Revolution and the Battle over American History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2010. Print.
Parker, Christopher S., and Matt A. Barreto. Change They Can’t Believe In: The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2013. Print.
Rosenthal, Lawrence, and Christine Trost. Steep: The Precipitous Rise of the Tea Party. Berkeley: U of California, 2012. Print.
Skocpol, Theda, and Vanessa Williamson. The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012. Print.
Wood, Gordon S. The Purpose of the Past: Reflections on the Uses of History. New York: Penguin, 2008. Print.
Zernike, Kate. Boiling Mad: Inside Tea Party America. New York: Times /Henry Holt, 2010. Print.
In support of the previously mentioned arguments, these works on the Tea Party and an evaluation of their collective memory is the premise of this series of posts. I have waited a long time to write this series and in doing so have built up a moderate body of evidence to assert my argument the Tea Party struggles to define itself within the GOP, the party’s (and its constituents’) historical and political narrative is blatantly incorrect.
With all this, there is much to say about the merits of history as a method to drive a narrative. The attempted use of history in any way is a fallacy in the field. The argument of the this series is to evaluate the facts of this movement, not to use history to massage facts to fit a narrative, a counter to what the Tea Party has done. Course-correcting the anti-history ship of the Tea Party requires a critical review of the historical narrative recounted by prior, critical works have evaluated the movement. If the contemporary fashion is to “use” history, this series of posts may seem to fall prey to presentism. This is not the purpose, which is to evaluate the short lived history of the Tea Party. As it has been relatively easy for the Tea Party to “use” history for their purpose, we all fall to the storm of presentism if we’re not careful. Abraham Lincoln’s quote above may reflect this point. Even as John Adams reflected on the American Revolution, he knew the pitfalls of how it might be used to prove a point: “The history of our revolution will be one continued [lie] from one end to the other.” [ref]Lepore, The Whites in Their Eyes. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2010, 44.[/ref] As Lincoln said, the revolution “will never be forgotten.”
Recently my wife and I went to San Francisco for a wedding. While I was there, I needed to complete some school work and went to the Mission District in search of coffee shops to park myself for hours. I expected beautiful people with beautiful landmarks: done. Beyond this, I did not expect to encounter the large number of homeless that exists on nearly every street.
Before delving into my observation of this backwards town, I would like to note there is no scientific data behind my assumptions and arguments, rather an account of what I saw and experienced.
For a quick four day adventure supporting close friends in their marriage, the preparation for me included a tie, dress shoes, and bringing copious amounts of reading for two summer grad school classes. Knowing there might be down-time, I scoured the city for coffee shop with free WiFi that would allow me to sit for hours to work on said homework. I had minimal success at this: coffee shops abound, but wifi is scarce.
As I walked the Mission District, seemingly the largest of the less expensive areas of the city, homelessness and low-income housing abound. I never saw Section 8 housing, but I was told it exists in small portions of the city. Along side $4.87 unleaded gas and “skinny” jeaned hipsters were troves of homeless asleep in alleys or asking for support on sidewalks. The younger, upper-middle class would scoot around them and enjoyed their time in the trendy, but un-gentrified city-scape.
Included in the weekend’s wedding festivities was a four hour bus tour around the city of San Francisco that included all the scenic San Franciscan spots. Our bus driver was a native, one of the very few in the city. He’s knowledge and folksy commentary gave more insight into the city’s people and sectioned areas of the many have’s and have-not’s. As we toured the predominately gay district, The Castro District, the bus driver’s disdain for homelessness overflowed as he described some of the younger people have chosen to be homeless as if it were a posh niche in the area. Once we entered the downtown area, his inability to find the word “gentrification” for the recent rise in housing prices across the city led many of us to understand his status in the city as truly being outsider to his own city.
Most all of the time that I spent walking around the city (which was not nearly as much as I would have liked), I never felt “unsafe” and found the people to be polite and extremely welcoming. With such a large population originally not from the area, it amazed me the city functions in the manner that it does: effectively. Seemingly, most of the population settles here does so because the tech sector continues to explode. The people don’t seem to make up the city, but their money does.
The Politics of Money
As we rode in the comfortable charter bus (that had WiFi) for our tour of the city, the native bus driver described the conditions of the city government functioning at a low level due to the lack revenue being lost through various loop holes either intended or not by political leaders. As the city evolves into a “Pacific Manhattan”, the city hasn’t evolved their taxing methods, nor does their understanding of how to structure an explosion of a newly gentrified area seem evident. One of the most surprising facts of our bus driver shared with us is the small number of people that live in the city: only 850,000. With the amount of homeless, I expected the population to be double (plus some). Denver broke 600,000 in 2012. With the new (and unusual) economic boom in recreational marijuana, Denver’s population will most-likely follow. The difference between the two cities is space: San Francisco has none. This explains the extraordinary price of rent in nearly every corner of the city. A city expert bus driver proclaimed the city will have 100 more highrises in the next 20 years to meet population demands. Along with this is an extensive busing system as some commute as much as 65 miles away (one way) each day. San Francisco has a serious hyper-modern urbanization problem.
Between a young, wealthy population, few residents living on rent-control, and an unnecessarily large homeless population, San Francisco is in danger of alienating itself from a middle class. Even as I despise a liberal economic system, the exploding population of San Francisco NEEDS “ditch-diggers” of all types to continue it’s current economic pace: up. In the future it will be impossible to import non-technical/professional work on a large scale. No matter the success of the Silicon Valley, San Franciscans will cease to function as a city as they have very little sociological understanding of themselves.
Also, half of the peninsula would crumble into the Pacific Ocean with a decent sized earthquake.
The Two Put Together: Lowlights and highlights
I love San Francisco. With so many different pockets of beauty and nostalgia, it’s in serious danger of losing itself. My wife and I fell in love years ago in this city and have amazing and fond memories of our time here. The Victorian era construction is unforgettable and worth the millions each building is worth. The changing demographics of the city won’t change the feeling it produces, but the hope of continuing it’s success as a town needs serious reconsideration and direction. The various groups (immigrants, the LGBT community, the tech industry, etc.) will hopefully find a common ground and space for the traditional worker.
My support for the “worker” and their rights within society seems to find little support in a city historically known to support the minority. Money has the ability to blind so many in positions with the ability to advocate for those who cannot. I hope San Francisco remembers it past to avert disaster in the future.